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The construction and use of phylogenetic trees is  central to modern systematics. But it is 
unclear exactly what phylogenies  and phylogenetic trees represent. They are sometimes 
said to represent genealogical relationships  between taxa, between species, or simply 
between “groups  of organisms.” But these are incompatible representational claims. This 
paper focuses on how trees  are used to make inferences  and then argues  that this  focus 
requires that phylogenies represent the histories of  populations. 
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1. Introduction
The project of this  paper is  to understand what a phylogenetic tree represents  and to discuss  some of the 
implications  that this  has  for the practice of systematics. At least the first part of this  task, if not both parts, 
might appear trivial—or perhaps  better suited for a single page in a textbook rather than a scholarly 
research paper. But this  would be a mistake. While the task of interpreting phylogenetic trees  is often treated 
in a trivial way, their interpretation is  tied to foundational conceptual questions  at the heart of systematics—
questions  whose answers are hotly disputed. I have previously argued that widely shared ideas  about the 
meaning and interpretation of phylogenetic trees  are inconsistent with species  concepts  other than some 
genealogical version of a phylogenetic species  concept (Velasco 2008). Here I rely on a similar approach and 
concentrate on the implications of the necessary conditions  underlying the inferences  that we make using 
phylogenetic trees. I argue that common practices for the interpretation and use of trees  are in conflict and 
that unacceptable principles  about species as  units  of phylogeny must be given up. According to the view 
that I will develop, all phylogenetic trees  depict the history of populations.1 The branches  on trees represent 
collections of population lineages  through time and the splits  represent population lineage splits. This  is  true 
regardless  of whether the tips  of the trees are themselves populations, or are species  or higher taxa. 
Although this  conclusion might be paired naturally with a view that species  must be monophyletic groups, 
this  population-centric view of trees is  independent of that view of species. If we still want to have species 
that are paraphyletic groups  of populations, this  is  permissible as  long as  we also do not treat species  as  the 
units  of phylogeny. This  population-centric view opposes  a species-centric view of phylogeny and might be 
called a “rank-free” approach since it entails  that we do not need to determine which groups  are species 
(which is  partly a ranking question) in order to build a tree. This conclusion and the argument for it are 
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meant to be consistent with, but not require, acceptance of the conclusions  of Velasco (2008) regarding 
species. 
2. Reading and Using Phylogenetic Trees
Phylogenetic trees  depict genealogical relationships  between various  groups  of organisms. The 
interpretation and use of trees  for inferences  is  central to systematics  and many introductions  to the field (or 
even to biology generally) start with this topic.2 Important for us  will be how trees are used to make 
inferences about the past. A straightforward example of this is  inferring trait evolution. Figure 1 depicts  one 
reasonable phylogeny of the major amniote clades. Each tip is  a monophyletic group any of whose members 
can stand in for the genealogical relationship of any other member. For example, every bird (in Aves) has  the 
same relationship to any group in any other clade including any crocodile (in Crocodylia), any turtle (in 
Testudines) and any lizard or snake (in Squamata). The nodes  represent real divergence points: birds  and 
crocodiles  share a common ancestor about 219 million years ago (mya), birds and turtles  about 231 mya, 
and birds  and lizards  about 275 mya. More traditional phylogenies  put turtles  elsewhere, such as  sister to the 
rest of Sauropsida. In that case, the dating of the bird-turtle split is  closer to 300 mya (Carroll 1988). The 
branches  represent real lineages  that lead to organisms  at that tip and none of the other tips. This  is  essential 
for tracing the effect of evolutionary changes  along the branches. When we study the effects  of trait 
evolution, we must know (or at least have an estimate of) the underlying phylogeny.
For example, birds  and crocodiles  but no other living reptiles  have a gizzard. The gizzard is  a kind of 
specialized stomach, attached to the “true” stomach, which allows  these organisms  to swallow stones  and 
then use them to aid in the breakdown of food that is  passed back and forth between the glandular stomach 
and the gizzard. How and when did the gizzard evolve? Given the true phylogeny, we can infer that it 
probably evolved on the indicated branch that leads  to both the birds  and the crocodiles, but leads  to 
nothing else (Figure 1). That would mean the gizzard evolved between 219 and 231 mya and has  been 
inherited by birds  and crocodiles, both of which are descendants  of this  branch. In other words, the gizzards 
in birds and crocodiles  are homologous. Incidentally, this  also would mean that the dinosaurs  had gizzards  as 
they are on the branch leading to the birds. This implication could be erroneous; for example, it is  possible 
that the gizzard evolved earlier and it was  lost in the branch leading to the turtles. Alternatively, it is  possible 
Figure 1 — Time tree of  the amniotes (from Shedlock and Edwards 2009). The divergence times (with sources 
and associated confidence intervals) are found in their Table 1 (not shown here). Abbreviations: C 
(Carboniferous), CZ (Cenozoic), J (Jurassic), Ng (Neogene), P (Permian), Pg (Paleogene), and Tr (Triassic). The 
added bar points out where we infer the gizzards to have evolved.
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that the gizzard has  evolved twice. Some other organisms have gizzard-like organs such as  certain fish and 
even earthworms. Again, with the proper phylogenetic tree, it is  easy to see that either massive numbers of 
groups  have lost the gizzard, or it has  independently evolved in the fish, earthworms, and archosaurs. A 
detailed examination of the “gizzards” in the earthworms  and fish makes  it clear that many of the 
similarities  are only superficial and these are not really the same character trait being expressed in the 
different groups, unlike in the crocodiles and the birds where the gizzard truly is the same character.
Thinking about how the tree constrains the possible evolutionary scenarios  leads  to the conclusion that 
the phylogeny has to represent the true history of the lineages  in question and not simply represent our 
classification scheme or a similarity metric of some kind. For example, on the traditional picture in which we 
classify birds  in class  Aves  and reptiles (like crocodiles) in class  Reptilia, it is  very tempting to place reptiles  at 
the tip of a tree as  a sister group to the birds. Depending on our views  about classification, it might be 
permissible to treat Reptilia as  a taxon for classification purposes, but it is  not permissible to use it as  the tip 
of a phylogenetic tree. We can see why this is  problematic when we try to expand the reptiles  into their 
traditional orders as  though classification dictated phylogeny (Figure 2). If the gizzard did evolve only once 
and spread to birds  and crocodiles, the proper explanation is  blocked since there is no branch on this 
diagram where the gizzard could have evolved in this  way. Instead it looks  like a massive coincidence that 
birds  and crocodiles  share such detailed similarities  like the gizzard and all of its  natural components. This  is 
especially odd given the obvious ecological differences  between birds  and crocodiles, which would lead to the 
apparent conclusion that they have been under very different selection pressures  for quite some time. Issues 
also will arise when we start thinking about extinct groups  such as  dinosaurs, which traditionally belong with 
reptiles, but in terms of traits  belong on the branch leading to the birds  (witness  the recent discoveries  of 
numerous feathered dinosaurs). 
The fact that this  tree cannot correspond to genealogy is seen also by trying to date the nodes. Exactly 
when did birds  split from reptiles? On this  tree, it appears that you could use crocodiles, lizards, or turtles 
equally as  your comparison group since they all appear equally related to birds. Or, perhaps to maximize the 
strength of your evidence, you should look at all the groups and do a sort of averaging of the evidence. But 
this  would be a mistake since birds  are related differently to different groups  of reptiles. Averaging the 
numbers would be meaningless.
Figure 2 — If  we use an incorrect phylogeny (for example, one based on a particular classification) and then 
attempt to infer facts about evolutionary history, such as the origin of  traits, we will make incorrect inferences. 
In this figure, we have treated the traditional reptiles as a single clade and then expanded the group into some of 
its taxonomic orders. Relationships on the tree represent classificatory relationships. Using this tree, it would 
appear that gizzards evolved twice independently, which is incorrect, and we also would infer incorrectly the 
dates of  various nodes.
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We arrived at Figure 2 by subdividing the reptiles  into smaller groups and placing those groups  in the 
location where the reptiles  were (stemming from the same node). This  is  called expansion. Similarly, we can 
always  collapse sister groups  together into a larger clade (merging or contraction). We also should be able to 
add and subtract taxa without changing the topological relationships  of the other members  of the tree 
(addition and subtraction, or pruning). These manipulations  will not affect the implied genealogical 
relationships  of the groups  and so should not affect our inferences  about history. For example, if we altered 
the tree in Figure 1 by expanding the birds  into several subgroups, all of which have gizzards, collapsed the 
lepidosaurs  into a single group stemming from node 3, and removed mammals  entirely, our inference 
regarding the origins of the gizzard would not change. For ease of communication, I will call these tree 
manipulation principles. These are usually assumed to hold and are used without comment, but sometimes  they 
are explicitly described as  essential to understanding how trees work (e.g., Baum and Smith 2012) or for 
understanding how evolutionary explanations  work more generally (O’Hara 1997). But tree manipulation 
principles combined with the placement of  arbitrary groups as taxa on trees lead to absurdity.
The misrepresentation that results  from phylogenies  that do not represent history has dire consequences 
when we try to use trees to make inferences. Genealogical trees  are essential for testing selection hypotheses, 
testing models  of rates of evolutionary change (such as the molecular clock hypothesis), doing comparative 
biology (are traits  X and Y correlated?), and for testing biogeographical hypotheses  (did marsupials  originate 
in Australia or migrate from elsewhere?). Any inference that requires  knowing the history of any groups  will 
require an estimate of the phylogenetic tree. Knowing a traditional classification of this group or knowing 
which groups are similar to other groups  helps  a lot for phylogenetic purposes, but only insofar as  it is  a good 
guide to the true genealogy.
We now have an argument that no taxon—a group placed at the tip of a tree—could be a paraphyletic 
group. For the same reasons, if we are going to ask questions about groups  above the species  level, such as 
“when did this  group originate?,” “when did this group diverge from this other group?,” or “has group X 
undergone anagenetic change faster than group Y?,” the groups  in question must be clades or these 
questions  will make no sense. If we add some background assumptions, such as we can always  treat taxa (in 
classification) as  taxa (tips  of trees  in phylogenetics), and we are consistent in how we use trees, then this  is  an 
argument for a phylogenetic system of classification as  well (Velasco 2008). But even if we don’t accept this 
last step, at least we must all agree that our phylogenies should not depend on our classification. 
While the statement that the correct phylogenetic tree does  not depend on how we classify would 
probably find near universal agreement, our current practices  dictate that phylogenies are dependent on 
classification. This  is  because on most views  of phylogeny, at least according to the definitions  typically given 
(though not the practice as  we will see), what constitutes a clade is  determined by which groups are species 
and what counts  as  speciation. On most views (both by definitions and by practice) this  aspect of systematics 
is determined partly by our classification of  what counts as a species and not directly by history.
I have so far only presented claims  about what a tree represents  and how to read and use phylogenetic 
trees. What I have said is  relatively uncontroversial. However, as  I will argue, tree manipulation principles 
like expansion and contraction or addition and subtraction, which are essential underpinnings for the 
inferential role that trees  play, conflict with other principles  of trees—those involving species. Perhaps  after 
further consideration, we will decide to give up certain manipulation principles. But doing so would invite a 
host of problems  that we should avoid. As we have just seen in our example of the gizzard, manipulation 
principles  are tied to the ability to make historical inferences  using trees. For this  reason, I will proceed as 
though we should hold on to these principles and see where they lead us.
3. Population Trees
We now have an argument that all groups  placed at the tips  of trees  must be monophyletic clades. A tree 
then displays  the relationships  between these tips. For example, according to Figure 1, there is  a clade that 
contains  crocodiles  and birds  but not snakes. But what is  a clade? A standard definition is  some ancestor and 
all of its  descendants. Traditionally, this  means  an ancestral species  and all the species  descended from it. 
Alternatively, we could say directly that the genealogical claim cited above means that the most recent 
common ancestor of birds  and crocodiles  is  a descendant of the most recent common ancestor of crocodiles 
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and snakes. But what has ancestor-descendant relationships  in this  way? Again, the traditional answer is  that 
this  is  all done with species. Phylogenetic trees  are ultimately about the relationships  between species. If we 
put birds at the tip, it merely represents a collection of  all the bird species.
That phylogenetic trees  are really species  trees  in this sense is  a common sentiment: “A phylogenetic tree 
is  a representation of the historical course of speciation. … It is  the business  of phylogenetic systematists to 
attempt to recover this  history of speciation” (Wiley 1981, 2). That the great Tree of Life is  a phylogenetic 
tree and a tree of species is  found throughout the literature (Cracraft and Donoghue 2004; Dawkins  2004; 
Hodkinson and Parnell 2006). Despite the rhetoric, in practice these authors, along with everyone else, do 
not treat phylogenetic trees  as  species  trees in this  sense. As  I will argue, thinking of trees in this  way conflicts 
with the tree manipulation principles  and would serve as a faulty foundation for history-based phylogenetic 
inferences.
If all phylogenetic trees  are ultimately species  trees, then species  are like atoms  with no internal parts 
that have phylogenies. But if our practices  are any guide, this  is  not correct. Though we do primarily talk 
about species trees, we also talk about and use population trees. “Species tree” refers  to a tree that has  species  at 
the tips  regardless  of how it is  interpreted, whereas  “population tree” refers  to a tree that has  at least some 
subspecific populations as tips. 
Phylogenetic trees  containing tips  that are smaller than species  are commonplace in the literature. 
Sometimes  they depict the relationships  between named groups, such as subspecies  or varieties; other times 
the tips  are different populations  of the same species, usually delimited by geography. These trees are used 
for precisely the same purposes  as species trees: representing the history of groups  of organisms in a way 
useful for historical inferences. In his book Evolutionary Pathways in Nature (Avise 2006), John Avise explains  the 
phylogenetic approach to inferring evolutionary history and summarizes a large number of examples where 
trees  have played an essential role. Earlier, we saw an example of phylogenetic character mapping above the 
species level when we examined the gizzard (Figure 1). While the majority of Avise’s  examples  are at or 
above the species  level, several of them involve subspecific groups. For example, Avise examines  the 
evolution of the bold black and red plumage in poisonous birds—the Hooded and the Variable Pitohui 
(Pitohui dichrous and P. kirhocephalus)—using data from Dumbacher and Fleisher (2001) (Avise 2006, 65–68). By 
finding clades  of subspecific populations, we can see that the phylogenetic evidence indicates  that the distinct 
plumage pattern was probably the shared ancestral state of the Pitohuis  and not due to convergent 
evolution. However, in one population on the Wandammen Peninsula of New Guinea’s  north coast, this 
distinct plumage pattern was  found embedded in a clade that otherwise lacked the pattern, making it quite 
likely that in this  population the plumage pattern was secondarily gained as  an instance of mimicry. It was 
essential in this  case not only to find clades  of populations within a single species, but to plot their 
relationships  to other species  as  well. Thus  the phylogeny depicted is  not a pure population tree or pure 
species tree.
Similar studies  have been carried out closer to our taxonomic home. Morin et al. (1994), Kaessmann et 
al. (1999), Won and Hey (2003), and many others  have investigated the divergence of chimpanzee species 
and subspecies  and a huge number of studies  have been done on the population history of humans (Cavalli-
Sforza et al. 1994; Templeton 2007). Research in both groups  is  usefully summarized in Arnold (2009). Alan 
Templeton has  famously argued against various  population trees  of humans. But he does  not argue that 
these population trees  are meaningless; rather, they are meaningful and have genealogical implications—
implications  that have been repeatedly tested and found wanting (Templeton 2002, 2005, 2007). Entire 
subdisciplines  such as  phylogeography, divergence population genetics, and coalescent methods  depend on 
the study of population histories. To deny that phylogenetic trees  and methods  are profitably applied below 
the species level is to claim that each of  these subdisciplines is fundamentally flawed in its foundations.
4. The Problem with Population Trees
Although biologists  create and use population trees, there are reasons  to worry about their 
interpretation. One reason is  that systematists  often define phylogenies  in terms  of species. If we do this, 
then populations  do not have phylogenetic relationships. But we don’t want to simply rely on traditional 
definitions  (which are not all consistent with each other); we want to examine the reasons  behind them. And 
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the primary reason to think that there is  something fundamentally wrong with population trees  is  that 
populations are not completely isolated from one another—they reticulate.
In many cases, this claim is  false. There are a variety of recognized conspecific populations  with no gene 
flow between them. In sexual species, many populations  are isolated from others, often for geographical 
reasons  such as  a river or mountain range forming external barriers to reproduction. Many species  concepts, 
most clearly internodal concepts  (Ridley 1989; Kornet 1993), might raise such groups  to the rank of species. 
If they have been isolated long enough, we might expect that the groups would have their own apomorphies 
in which case some phylogenetic species concepts  would recognize multiple species. But this  lack of gene 
flow is  consistent with conspecificity on other species  concepts. For example, the biological species  concept 
demands  intrinsic reproductive isolation, which these populations might lack and these populations  may not 
have diverged ecologically or morphologically in significant ways  and thus  are conspecific on various 
ecological and morphological concepts  as  well. For many species  concepts, population trees  can be 
meaningful, even on the unnecessarily strict interpretation of requiring no gene flow between distinct 
lineages. 
While this suggests  that some population trees  can be meaningful, to use them as  the foundation for 
phylogenetics  one would want a much more robust defense. Phylogenetic differentiation should be 
meaningful in the face of reticulation. But the natural interpretation of branching on a tree is  that there is 
no more gene flow between the separate branches. Reticulations  are more naturally represented by a 
network with lateral connections  as  well as  vertical branches, rather than a strict tree. While this clarity has 
advantages, it comes  at a high price. Not only do we have to reinterpret a massive amount of good 
phylogenetic work being done below the species  level, but above the traditional species level as  well. It is  very 
common for well-defined and accepted species to not be completely isolated.
Mallet (2005) surveys a variety of studies  on hybrids and concludes  that at least 25% of plant and 10% 
of animal species  form hybrids  with other species  in nature. This  usually leads  to introgression and therefore 
gene flow between species. And this is  surely an underestimate as  it is  based on our own enormously 
inadequate sampling conducted by examining organisms in the wild. Even in species with relatively 
contained geographical habitats, we cannot examine every organism. And individual hybrid organisms  are 
not always detectable by way of  morphological differences.
Worries  about gene flow between different species  depend heavily on what groups  we classify as  species. 
Different species  concepts  lead to different species. A major reason for the development of the ecological 
species concept was  that important ecological differences can persist in spite of gene flow, such as  in the 
famous  case of oak trees  in the genus  Quercus (Van Valen 1976). The same example shows  that 
morphological differences  can persist in spite of gene flow as  well. In recent years  there has  been a trend 
toward taxonomic inflation as more and more previously recognized species are split into distinct groups—
often for conservation purposes  (Mallet 2005). For example, according to his  version of the phylogenetic 
species concept, Joel Cracraft estimates  that the number of bird species  could rise from approximately 9,000 
to approximately 18,000 (Cracraft 1997). Many of these distinct subspecies  are morphologically 
distinguishable from others  and all are genetically distinguishable. Yet there is  frequently substantial gene 
flow between them, which is  why they were not recognized as  separate species initially. This  naturally leads 
to increased “hybridization” between groups.
Even when not raised to the rank of species, a number of subspecific groups in nature have been 
recognized as  special subspecies  or evolutionarily significant units  (Ryder 1986; Moritz 1994; Hey et al. 
2003). If we wish to inquire about the history of these groups and ask questions about their origins and 
relations  to other groups, phylogenies  are required. So if we deny that population trees  make sense in the 
face of reticulation, we also must deny that many species  trees  are meaningful. Perhaps for some species 
there would be no correct phylogenetic tree with them as  tips. Not only would this  unnecessarily hamper the 
study of the history of these groups, it would destroy the supposedly solid foundation of phylogenetic trees 
at higher taxonomic levels. When we reflect on the way that phylogenetic trees  are used, clearly species  trees 
can be meaningful and useful even in the face of reticulation. Thus  we should accept that population trees 
are meaningful as well.
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5. What are Population Trees?
A problem that the defender of population trees  must face is  how to interpret branching in a way 
consistent with reticulation. A helpful start is  to think of phylogenetic trees  as  models  that contain 
idealizations  (Velasco 2012). This  means  that we are not forced to say exactly when and where splits  take 
place, how much reticulation is sufficient for the continued integrity of a lineage, or which group of 
organisms constitutes a clade. But we still need to say what historical relationships we are trying to model. 
One way to do this  would be parallel to defining species  trees  as  the history of speciation—we define 
populations  and then use the definition to determine when one population has  split into two; population 
trees  model this  process. Defining “population” and “population split” is  not easy, though some have tried 
(Millstein 2010). But focusing on the definition of species  and the necessity of determining the precise timing 
of speciation is  what gets  species  trees  in trouble. Replacing “species” with “population” is  unlikely to help. 
Rather, we should focus on the pattern of divergence and build our trees  from that. We could use this 
understanding of phylogeny to define populations in terms of gene flow or divergence just as some want to 
define species  that way. I remain agnostic on the issue and instead focus  on what a phylogenetic tree could 
mean regardless of  what we call the groups of  organisms at the tips. 
Our goal is  to understand the meaning of phylogeny without resorting to defining it with species. One 
approach is  to define it with population histories. If populations  are defined historically, then this  might 
work. But a better approach is  to think directly about what the pattern of divergence between groups  of 
organisms  could represent in a phylogeny. A useful way to proceed with this  problem is to think about what 
kinds of  entities can be on the tips of  phylogenetic trees.
We have already said that monophyletic clades  are allowed to be placed at the tips  of trees. But we have 
not answered the central question of what a clade is. When dealing directly with groups  of organisms, it 
seems  that we would need them to be an exclusive group in the sense that any organism in the population is 
more closely related to any other than to any outside the population. If we define the genealogical 
relatedness of organisms  using recency of common ancestry (Velasco 2009), we get a very stringent criterion 
whereby populations  would almost never count as  exclusive: a single migrant from another population who 
has  offspring would collapse the two separate lineages. This  is too extreme. Alternatively, we can define 
exclusivity in terms  of gene trees. The most sensible view is  that an exclusive group is  a group where the 
proportion of the genome that forms a clade is  higher than any conflicting potential clade (Ané et al. 2007; 
Baum 2007). This  view was  designed as  a way to talk generally about clades  of all sizes. We could use 
concordance factors  to determine subspecies  (Avise and Ball 1990) or species  and phylogeny more generally 
(Baum 2009; Velasco 2010). Regardless, phylogeny is not determined by our classification but rather by 
genealogical history.
Concordance factors  are just one way that we might determine phylogeny. Many methods  exist for 
determining species  trees  or population trees  that look at the pattern of divergence and do not define 
phylogenies  in terms  of the process of species or population splitting. For example, using coalescent methods 
we can infer the likely patterns of lineage branching, taking advantage of the depth of gene coalescence and 
not just the topology (Knowles  and Maddison 2002; Edwards  2009). We also can use divergence population 
genetics  to infer levels of past gene flow and depict that pattern with our trees  (Won and Hey 2003). What is 
important in all these cases  is  that we are inferring the history of groups  of organisms independently from how 
we wish to classify them. Perhaps  we are examining conspecific populations, or entirely separate species, or 
even a mix of the two. It is  irrelevant. The methods  are the same because the phylogenies  mean the same 
thing in any case. Population level phylogenies  can be meaningful because populations have genealogical 
histories that are useful to represent.
6. When Species Trees and Population Trees Disagree
Even if we accept that population trees can be meaningful, this  is  a long way from showing that they are 
the foundation for all phylogenetic trees. The key argument for this  conclusion is  that the truth of species 
phylogenies  (i.e., which species  are genealogically more closely related to others) are determined by 
population level divergences  and not by recency of speciation events. I will argue for this  by examining an 
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instance of the set of common cases where two different ways  of understanding the tree lead to different 
conclusions: the “The Wrong Tree” problem (Velasco 2008). In such cases, phylogenetics  should be 
concerned with population trees.
It is  a clear mistake to place paraphyletic groups  (e.g., the reptiles or the fishes) at the tips  of phylogenetic 
trees. Such groups  do not have a unique history that is not shared by other groups. But many species  are 
paraphyletic groups of populations; some populations  in these species  are more closely related to other 
species than to other populations  in their own species. By reasoning that is completely parallel with the case 
of  higher taxa, such species cannot serve as phylogenetic units at the tips of  trees.
That such groups  of paraphyletic species are common is  well known. It is  trivial for such groups to form 
(Figure 3). Start with two phylogenetically distinct populations of the same species. Call them A1 and A2. 
Now imagine that a new population splits  off from A1 and the resulting lineage becomes a new species. Call 
this  species  B. Now species A (=A1+A2) is  a paraphyletic group consisting of some but not all the 
populations  descended from the ancestral A population. A phylogenetic tree with A at a tip would be 
misleading since some of the As  (namely, the A1s) would be more closely related to species  B than to other 
members  of their own species  (the A2s). To make the inconsistency more obvious, just fast-forward in time; 
A1 and A2 have continued to diverge and are now separate species. Perhaps  there has  been another lineage 
split so no anagenesis  is  required. If the species  tree tracks speciation history, A1 will be more closely related 
to A2 and the relationships  will be (B, (A1, A2)). But this  tree is  not phylogenetically meaningful since 
tracking the history of populations, organisms, or genes will give us  the result that A1 is  closer to B than to 
A2 (Figure 3). It is  this  tree where the lineage splits  are defined by the population level splits  and not the 
speciation events  that is  meaningful for historical inferences. When they became distinct species according to 
some particular species concept is irrelevant.3
That such examples  of apparent inconsistency are common is  not in dispute. What is  in dispute is  what 
to do about it. Given the fact that biologists  use population trees and define phylogenetic trees  as  species 
trees, the answer would appear to be species  trees  and population trees  just represent different things  and so 
they cannot be genuinely inconsistent. Though this  would appear to be the obvious  answer, I know of no 
one in the literature who explicitly endorses  it. While this  is  a possible resolution to the problem, I argue that 
the costs associated with the resolution are too high.
7. Privileging Species Trees
In this  section, I will argue against the view that phylogenies  are fundamentally species  trees as  defined 
by the history of speciation. One consequence of this  species-centric view is  that population trees  are not 
phylogenies  or at least not phylogenies  of the same kind. They track the history of populations  and lineage 
Figure 3 — At t1, two populations of  the same species split. This is not a speciation event. Then at t2, a new 
species B splits off  from A1. After t3, A1 and A2 are now considered different species. If  we want to use trees for 
historical inferences, such as reconstructing the history of  traits, we will need to use the tree defined by 
population splits and not speciation events. 
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splits  while species  trees  track speciations. But this strict separation between species  trees and population 
trees  has numerous  odd consequences, some more serious than others. For example, recall that the inference 
about the history of the plumage in the Variable Pitohuis  required examining the relationships  of some of 
the populations  not just in relation to other conspecific populations  but to other species  as  well. This 
particular path of investigation would be unavailable since the trees  used in the study are apparently 
meaningless; it seems incoherent to use a tree with a mix of species  and non-species  at the tips. What could 
count as a split between a population and a species? It can’t be a speciation event. We could perhaps  try to 
give them meaning by treating them as  population trees and treating the species in question (and any other 
higher taxon as  well) as  placed on the tree due to the population-level histories  of the populations  inside it. If 
the taxon in question happens  to be a monophyletic group of populations, this might work out. But on most 
views  of species, there is  no problem with a species being a paraphyletic group of populations. In such cases, 
it is entirely unclear where a single species  qua group of populations  should go on a population tree when the 
populations inside it belong in different places. 
While there are stipulations we could make about how to deal with such cases, they all lead to problems 
when we try to use the tree for inferences  about the past. Recall that paraphyly at the higher level leads  to 
mistaken inferences  about evolutionary history. When we insisted on treating reptiles  as  a single group apart 
from birds, we were blocked from recognizing the true history of the gizzard—that it is  shared between birds 
and some, but not all, reptiles. Similarly, when we collapse paraphyletic species into a single tip of a tree, we 
are blocked from recognizing the true history of traits that are shared between one species  and some, but not 
all, populations  of the paraphyletic species. Attempts  to date nonexistent or misleading nodes  would lead to 
incorrect pictures  of the history and lead us  astray in inferring biogeography and morphological or 
molecular histories. 
Even when all the populations in a taxon belong in the same place on a tree, the species-centric view can 
cause problems. The relationship of species  to each other due to speciation events  can come apart from the 
relationships  of the populations  inside them (Velasco 2008). The only reasonable way to interpret a species-
centric view is  that when the tree in question has only species  at its  tips, the default is  that it is  a species tree 
defined by species-level history while any tree with subspecific populations  at the tips, even if some of the 
tips  are species, is  defined by population-level history. But then how species  are related to each other as  part 
of a species  tree could be different from how the very same groups are related to each other on a population 
tree. This is certain to cause immense confusion even if  we can avoid strict inconsistency.
Notice what now follows on this  species-centric view. First, generalized manipulation principles  fail. A 
general principle of expansion implies  that if we took a species  tree and replaced a single species with 
multiple populations from that species, we would not need to adjust the remainder of the tree in any way. 
Generalized contraction implies  that if we had a population tree consisting of populations  in many different 
species, and we then collapsed the conspecifics into single groups, we would not need to adjust the tree. If we 
allow paraphyletic species, now or in the past, and use species-centric phylogenies, both are false. Similar 
problems  exist for addition and subtraction of branches. Each of these failures  requires  that we can have 
mixed species  and population trees, or at least can transition from one to the other without changing 
topologies. If we can’t do this  because they mean different things, then we can still hold on to restricted 
forms of  the manipulation principles.
Perhaps  more importantly, when we build phylogenetic trees, it would be essential to decide if we are 
building a species tree or a population tree. The same tips  and the same evidence could lead us  to produce 
different trees  depending on which we were hoping to build. If we asked, “how are chimps related to gorillas 
and humans?,” the proper response might be to say, “be more specific, do you mean how are the populations 
related? Or, how are the species  related?” If we were to build the tree using data from individual organisms 
that we take to be representative of larger groups, we would need to know whether we intend these larger 
groups  to be species  or populations. It would be essential to ask this  question because the correct answer 
about relationships could vary depending on what type of  tree you were interested in (Velasco 2008).
In the desired compatibility situation, we could build a tree of groups  and say that it doesn’t matter 
whether the tips are all separate species  or (e.g.) whether two tips are different populations of the same 
species. But according to the view that population trees  are interpreted differently than species  trees, this 
would matter. Since how a group is  related to another now depends  on whether we are asking about species 
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or population history, it becomes  essential to rank groups properly. For example, whether a particular group 
is  a subspecies  or a genuine species  might make a difference in how it is  phylogenetically related to other 
groups. The topologies of  the population and species trees it is a part of  might be different.
A related worry is  that even if we determined that we were looking for a species tree, we would need to 
specify some particular species concept by which we were building our tree. Simply pointing out that we 
have evidence that the genes, organisms, or populations  were related in certain ways wouldn’t entail how the 
species were related. And we would have to settle on more than a particular grouping criterion—a ranking 
criterion would be needed as well.
LaPorte (2005) accepts  the “speciation history” definition of species  trees  and argues  that since there is 
no objectively correct definition of species, there is no objectively correct evolutionary tree. LaPorte is 
correct; if we define a species  tree by speciation history, then different species  concepts  lead to different trees. 
One way out of this  is  to insist that only certain species  concepts are correct. But barring agreement on 
which concepts those are, it would seem impossible for phylogeneticists  to agree on the correctness  of their 
trees. Yet in practice, they do agree. This  could be explained by some kind of more general agreement about 
what species are, but this type of  proposal faces several problems.
One common reason for thinking that species  are special is  that they are the units  of evolution. This  is 
certainly a popular view; an anthology of important papers  on species  has  been called The Units of Evolution: 
Essays on the Nature of Species (Ereshefsky 1992). It is  perfectly reasonable to attempt to figure out whether 
evolutionary units are objective features  of the world and what they are like. What is  questionable is  whether 
these evolutionary units uniquely pick out species.
It is  unclear what different authors  mean by “evolutionary unit” (various  possibilities  are surveyed in 
Ereshefsky 1991). Some authors  argue that species  play a role in the theory of evolution, which requires 
them to be individuals  (Hull 1980; Williams  1985). Others  say that they are the unit of selection (Gould 
2002) or perhaps  objects  of selection (Mayr 1997)—this  means  that species  evolve whereas  organisms, genes, 
and other biological entities  do not. In some extreme cases, the idea of an evolutionary process  is  built 
directly on the idea of what happens to species  through time (Eldredge and Cracraft 1980). But whether this 
is  accepted, it is  normally thought that to be a unit of evolution means  that regarding evolutionary forces—
such as  a changing environment leading to different selection pressures—the group responds  as  a single unit 
with a shared fate (Wiley 1981; Mayden 1997).
While some authors have argued that there are unique, objective evolutionary groups  that fit this 
definition (Simpson 1961; Wiley 1981; Mayden 1997), others  point out that there are no such universal, 
fundamental units. They hold that there are important, identifiable discontinuities  in genealogical, 
interbreeding, genetic, morphological, and ecological groups, but that these do not overlap. Different groups 
respond differently to different kinds of pressures  such that some groups  might be a unit regarding some 
forces  but not others  (Dupré 1999, 2001; Mishler and Donoghue 1982; Wilson 2005). Being a unit and 
responding as  a whole also seems to come in degrees; there will be nested and perhaps even overlapping 
groups, which are units  to some degree or other. On the face of it, small family units, demes, local 
populations, and groups  of multiple populations  all seem to be good candidates for groups  that are units 
with respect to evolutionary theory. Though it is  doubtful that there is  a single level in nature that represents 
the unit of evolution, if I were forced to pick such a level, then I would think that the population is  the 
natural level. Conspecific populations  are not united regarding the forces of evolution, which is  why species 
typically evolve from single populations  and not from entire ancestral species  (Mishler and Brandon 1987). 
The very phenomenon of paraphyletic species  serves  to reinforce this  point. When species  trees  and 
population trees  disagree, this  discordance arises because some species  has not functioned as  a single 
evolutionary unit.
While a number of authors  have thought that species, unlike subspecies  or genera, have unique and 
important properties, many others  have doubted this  (Ereshefsky 1991; Mishler 1999; Mallett et al. 2007; 
Baum 2009). They see species as  one level in a hierarchy—a level that is  rather arbitrary. Sometimes  authors 
espousing this  position hold that it is  reasonable to think that species  don’t exist. Another view is  that if 
species do exist, their boundaries  are arbitrary in a way. This  view is  not new—it goes  back to Darwin 
(Darwin 1859; Mallett 2008a,b; Ereshefsky 2009).
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Even if we could specify some reason that species  are uniquely important, we should not think that the 
phylogeny of species  are determined by speciation events. Cases  of disagreement between the species trees 
and the population trees  arise because our classifications  through time do not always  correspond to the 
genealogical histories  of the groups. But why should our phylogenies  track our classifications? Velasco (2008) 
describes  two types  of disagreement: the “No Tree” problem and the “Wrong Tree” problem. The names 
are appropriate if we assume that a correct phylogeny tracks  the history of populations. Imagine it doesn’t. 
Then since our phylogenetic inference methods  track the history of genes, organisms, and populations, they 
will deliver the population trees  and not the species  trees. This  is  good because if we attempted to use the 
species trees  as phylogenies, our inferences would be mistaken in the same way as  if we artificially placed 
crocodiles, lizards, and turtles  in a clade on a tree because they were all classified as  reptiles. In other words, 
our methods are aimed at recovering genealogy. If we were aiming for the history of speciation, our 
methods  are no good. It would be foolish to say that the history of speciation is  just unattainable as  a goal, 
but what we can be sure of is  that this  is  not what systematists  are interested in and not what currently used 
phylogenetic methods can recover.
The view that I am advocating might be construed as  rank-free phylogeny. Calls  for a rank-free 
taxonomy are controversial, and they are made even more so by the fact that traditional taxonomy requires 
ranks. But the call for rank-free phylogeny should not be so controversial. Phylogeneticists  have behaved this 
way for years. Ongoing debates  about the species  problem have not affected phylogenetics  in any way. 
Debates  about classification have focused on how to use a phylogeny if we knew it, and one major position 
in the species  debates  (the phylogenetic species  concept) requires  phylogenies  to be in place first to define 
species. While opponents  do not think that this  is  the correct species  concept, they do not (typically) argue 
for their position on the basis  of the claim that one cannot make sense of a phylogeny independent of 
classification. 
In the end, the view that population trees  and species  trees  represent fundamentally different things is  an 
unacceptable view. We can use species  trees  in the sense that we can use phylogenetic trees that have species 
at their tips. But even if we agreed that species  have a unique ontological status and identity through time, 
and we agreed that populations  also had identity through time, what counts  as  a genealogical relationship 
between populations  or between species  for the purposes of phylogenetics  requires that the phylogenetic 
relationships  between groups of these different kinds  be determined in the same way—by population-level 
splits. Population trees and species trees must be compatible.
8. What about Species?
So if species  trees  and population trees  must be consistent, what does  this  mean for species? As  the 
reader may have noticed, the most problematic cases mentioned in Section 7 stem from the fact that species 
might now be, or have been in the past, a paraphyletic group of populations. Defenders  of a history-based 
version of the phylogenetic species  concept do not accept that paraphyletic species  exist (Mishler and 
Donoghue 1982; Mishler 1985; Donoghue 1985; Velasco 2008). Such views  avoid many of the above 
problems. But apart from commitments  to the phylogenetic species concept, there are powerful arguments 
for avoiding species-centric definitions of  phylogeny. 
First, as  noted above, such authors  often use population trees  to determine which groups  are candidates 
for species. So population trees  must at least have some meaning apart from species  trees. We can imagine 
that we have both species  trees  and population trees  and that these are always  consistent. One suspects  that 
this  is  the same as  the population-centric view. After all, the species  trees  would have branches  that do 
correspond to population-level lineages  even if they “directly represent” species  lineages  and their splits  are 
population-level splits  even if they directly represent speciation events. The idea that these are somehow 
metaphysically different and carry a different interpretation than population trees, even though they are—
for all practical applications—exactly the same, strikes me as gratuitous and implausible. 
On a strict reading of the species-centric view, we don’t have exact equivalence of the population trees 
and the species  trees  anyway. Imagine a case where we have already had significant phylogenetic branching 
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of populations  within a species. Consider the ladder-shaped pectinate phylogeny of four populations  (A1,
(A2,(A3, A4))). Now if A4 splits  into two groups, call them E and F, including one uncontroversial new 
species, to avoid paraphyletic species, each group must now be a separate species. Labeling A1=A, A2=B, 
and A3=C, the population-level phylogeny is  still the ladder as  before: A, (B, (C, (E, F))). However, the 
natural way to interpret a species-centric view is  that phylogeny depends not just on which groups  are 
species, but also on when they became species. So on a strict reading of a species-centric view, there would 
be a massive polytomy resulting in a star phylogeny since all such groups speciated from each other at 
exactly the same time. Because we want to recover the more structured history, no competent systematist 
would argue for a star phylogeny as  the species  tree. But this  is  because they do not really believe that the 
species tree is determined by speciation events, but rather by the history of the lineages. In the distant past 
(say at t1) there was  a split between a group whose descendants  later became A1 and a group whose 
descendants  form A2, A3, and A4. This  was  not a speciation event at the time. But once these groups’ 
descendants  become independent species  of their own, we will want to represent this  split on the species  tree 
as  we would on any acceptable phylogeny. Thus  even with the most narrowly defined phylogenetic species 
concept, there is  still a reason to think of phylogenies  as  fundamentally about population histories  rather 
than species histories. 
I do not want anything significant to hinge on such examples. A species-centric phylogeneticist might 
attempt to retroactively call the split at t1 a speciation event or claim that it was  a speciation event all along 
because of what would happen in the future (O’Hara 1993). Determining exactly when speciation occurs  is 
a difficult issue and one that does  not have any problem free solutions  when combined with history-based 
phylogenies.4 But whatever we want to say about this  issue, restricting ourselves  to a particular kind of 
history-based species concept does not immediately make the species-centric view unproblematic. The only 
way to avoid species trees  coming apart from population trees  is  to have a species  concept whereby anything 
that would count as a population split also counts  as  speciation. This  leads  to the view that there can never 
be two distinct populations  of the same species  and is  so far divorced from taxonomic practice that I 
consider it to be unacceptable. But it is  worth noting that this is  perhaps  the ultimate expression of the 
“population-centric” view. 
So no matter what our species  concept, there is  a reason to treat phylogenies  as  fundamentally about 
population histories  and not species  histories. Where does  this  leave us  with respect to species? Harrison 
(1998) argues  that there are good reasons  to think that species  as  a whole have a life history and a species 
may be paraphyletic for much of its  history. As  for what happens  when we place them on trees, Harrison 
says  that we should not start with the assumption that species  must be units  of phylogeny. This  presumably 
means  that it is  not always  okay to place species at the tip of a phylogenetic tree and so we would have to 
eliminate the traditional understanding of  species trees. (This is consistent with what I have argued here.)
The solution to these tensions  is  obvious. Phylogenetic trees  should not be defined by the history of 
speciations  but rather by the history of lineages  and the pattern of their divergences. This conclusion is 
independent of any particular view of species. It may be that there are important reasons  to recognize the 
process  of speciation and for this  we should have some particular non-phylogenetic species  definition 
(Harrison 1998; Coyne and Orr 2004). But then species are not the foundation of phylogeny. It may be that 
it is  so important to recognize phylogenetic patterns  that our taxonomies  should be phylogenetically based 
and species, as  taxa, should be based on phylogeny as  well (Baum 2009). But species  still cannot serve as the 
foundation of phylogeny. The groups that do serve as  foundational in either case are subspecific, historically 
united groups—populations—and thus it is appropriate to think of  phylogenetic trees as population trees.
What is  not consistent is  to hold that (a) higher taxa are clades, (b) only clades  can serve as  the tips of 
phylogenetic trees, and (c) clades  are defined with species  and speciations, and then use a species  concept 
that allows for paraphyletic species. This  combination of views  is  widely held, explicitly so by some 
defenders  of the PhyloCode, such as  Kevin de Queiroz who argues  for a lineage-based concept of species 
(de Queiroz 1998, 1999). In the PhyloCode, clades can be specified by species, yet species  are treated in a 
fundamentally different way than clades  and can be named in any way consistent with the traditional ICBN 
and ICZN codes  (Dayrat et al. 2008; http://phylocode.org). This  allows for the possibility of paraphyletic 
species. Clades  (and so phylogenetic trees) can then supposedly be determined from these species, but this 
can lead to inconsistencies. Criticisms of how the PhyloCode deals  with species have been made (e.g., 
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Cellinese et al. 2012), but note that this  problematic combination of views is  held by many systematists  who 
have differing views  on classification, species, and nomenclature, and not just those who subscribe to the 
view espoused in the preface of  the PhyloCode.
We want to build and use phylogenetic trees, but we need some notion of what can constitute an 
acceptable taxon on a tree. In other words, we need to know what a clade is. Traditionally this  has  required 
the use of species, but it does  not need to be this  way. The possibility of building phylogenies without the 
prior use of species  has already been demonstrated with the additional call to get rid of the species  category 
altogether (Pleijel 1999; Pleijel and Rouse 2000a,b; Fisher 2006; Fisher et al. 2007). While this  position is 
consistent with my arguments  here, it does  not follow from them. We could continue to use “species” for 
classification and, when a species  is  a monophyletic group of populations, we could place it on a 
phylogenetic tree. But whether we keep the species rank or not, species  cannot be the foundation of 
phylogenetics.
9. The Power of  Semantics
That phylogenetic trees  are species  trees is  entrenched in the language of biologists, not only because of 
higher systematics  but also because of the enormous  literature on the issue of how gene trees  relate to 
species trees, which is  often approached using population genetic methods  (for a survey, see Edwards  2009). 
Frequently, questions  of definitions and semantics  are ignored by biologists  who assume that biological 
practice will determine such issues. Scott Edwards, a researcher who works  both above and below the species 
level, deals  directly with these issues. It is worth quoting him in full both for his  conclusion and the tone in 
which it is presented.
WHAT’S IN A NAME? It is  a legitimate question to ask, as  a colleague of mine did recently, whether 
species trees  have any validity if in fact the definition of species  is  still in limbo (as  they are likely to be 
for a long time). This colleague suggested that the term “population tree” is  better suited to the new 
paradigm, because it avoids  the issue of species  validity (notwithstanding the problem of defining 
populations  in nature). I would be happy with this  terminology, but defining it this  way might seem to 
exonerate those working at higher taxonomic levels, for whom population processes  are minor concerns. 
Phylogeneticists  working on the higher level questions  tend not to concern themselves  with populations, 
or their genetics. For this reason, “population trees” might become appropriated solely by 
phylogeographers  and those working near the species  level. This  would be unfortunate, because gene 
tree heterogeneity and the species  tree problem in principle affects all levels  of phylogeny, even if the 
extent of deep coalescence or branch length heterogeneity is  less  among higher taxa or sparsely sampled 
clades. For this  reason I suggest we simply exercise a verbal substitution and reserve the term 
“phylogeny” to refer to species  trees. Phylogenies as  they have been built in the last few decades  would 
then be called gene trees, which is generally what they are, sensu stricto (Edwards 2009, 12).
The questioner is worried that since there is  some problem about what species are, then there should be a 
parallel problem about species  trees. Not so, suggests Edwards. This  is  because there is  a large research 
program dedicated to separating species  trees  from gene trees and, within that paradigm, it is  quite clear 
what is  meant by a species  tree—the splits  are lineage branchings and not necessarily speciations (as 
measured by some definition). When his  colleague suggests  the term “population tree” instead, clearly 
Edwards  thinks  that these are the same thing—that it is  merely a question of what we ought to call the 
things  that we are inferring, not that species  trees  and population trees  are genuinely different or that there is 
a genuine question about which of the two we are inferring. The primary reason to continue using the name 
“species trees” is so that this important research does not get ignored in areas where it is needed.
Much of the literature in this field already speaks  of population trees  rather than species  trees, but the 
diagrams  and the methods  are the same—only the labels have changed (Takahata 1989; Knowles  and 
Maddison 2002). Others  explicitly identify species  trees  with population trees  (Pamilo and Nei 1988; Avise 
1989). The terminology seems  to be a matter of taste. The figures  in Edwards (2009) suggest that 
populations  and species  are different things  but that the topologies  between these are always  consistent. 
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Whether we simply eliminate talk of species  trees, identify species  trees with population trees, or view them 
as  distinguishable but always  consistent, it is  appropriate to think of phylogenetic trees  as  population trees 
representing the history of population lineages through time. Rather than being revolutionary, the idea that 
species trees are population trees is already deeply embedded as part of  phylogenetic practice. 
10. Conclusion
The divergence of lineages through time is  a continual process with no obvious  thresholds. At the very 
bottom we have local demes  with little or no mating structure. Moving to larger populations, especially those 
with geographical patterns, we get mating structure within populations. When this  structure persists  through 
time, phylogenetic patterns  begin to emerge. Populations  split and, over time, gene flow is  reduced and the 
patterns  are reinforced; significant differences  evolve in one population but not another and some 
systematists  would recognize a new species. Often gene flow between the groups  continues  to be reduced 
over time and the groups  continue to diverge ecologically, morphologically, and genetically. Eventually, by 
any species definition, we have distinct species. I told this  story in a way familiar to those who study 
speciation. Indeed, this  is  the standard model of speciation as  a process  of divergence through time. While it 
certainly doesn’t always happen this way, it often does.
But it would be a mistake to think of this  story as  a speciation story with reticulation throughout that 
ends with distinct species  and signals  the start of a new story—phylogenetic branching with a lack of 
reticulation. There is no important, completely general, species  boundary in nature. Species  are but one 
level of a continuum. If there is  a species  rank, it is  arbitrary in an important way. If we were to base our 
understanding of phylogeny and all of systematics  on this  arbitrary and often times misleading system of 
ranking, phylogenetics would be a flawed science. 
Fortunately, we do not have to base phylogenetics  on species. We can, and should, have rank-free 
phylogenies. It is  important to recognize that phylogeny is  not dependent on classification. It may be that 
species are important biological units  and there is  good reason to preserve the rank of species. It could even 
be that the higher ranks  like genus and family serve important functions for classification. But these 
conclusions  do not affect the practice of phylogenetics. We should recognize that phylogeny and genuine 
divergence is  present from the beginning of our story, albeit in a messy and not so easily tractable way. The 
story of divergence in the presence of reticulation continues above the traditional species  level. It is  a story 
that unites  the fields of systematics  and population genetics  in a way that recognizes  the genuine 
contributions  that each field makes  to the other (Avise 1989; Baum and Shaw 1995). These contributions  are 
required to truly understand and achieve the goal of  recovering the evolutionary history of  life.
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Notes
1. A reviewer points out that we also have phylogenies of genes (or various molecular bits) and what I say about 
phylogenies generally will not apply to phylogenies of genes. This  is true and I do not mean to suggest that these 
are not properly called “phylogenies.” This is  mainly a semantic issue and some authors  (e.g., Hennig) use 
“phylogeny” in a specific way that would not apply to genes. However,  it is  so common now to refer to molecular 
phylogenies that I see no reason to insist on overturning that. But molecular phylogenies are clearly a different 
kind of thing than a phylogeny of a group of organisms, which is the only thing I will talk about here. Whether 
there are multiple kinds of phylogenies  of organisms  and what the relationships  between them are is  the subject of 
the paper and I will leave genes for another time. It is  generally assumed that phylogenies  of genes and 
phylogenies of  groups of  organisms are conceptually distinct (but see, e.g., Baum 2009 and Velasco 2010).
2. I assume a basic familiarity with phylogenetic trees  and terms like monophyly and paraphyly. The ideal 
introduction for our purposes  is Velasco (2008),  but for a brief and more general introduction, see Baum et al. 
(2005). For a longer one, see Baum and Smith (2012).
3. For a more thorough discussion of variants of this example and what it means for how we should think about 
species, see Velasco (2008).
4. For careful examinations of  these diachronic issues, see (e.g.) Baum and Shaw (1995) and Baum (1998).
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